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Edgeworth’s Hedonimeter and the
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David Colander
This feature addresses the history of economic terms and ideas. The hope is to
deepen the workaday dialogue of economists, while perhaps also casting new light
on ongoing questions. If you have suggestions for future topics or authors, please
write to Joseph Persky, c/o Journal of Economic Perspectives, Department of Econom-
ics (M/C 144), University of Illinois at Chicago, 601 South Morgan Street, Room
2103, Chicago, Illinois 60607-7121.
Introduction
Economic thought progresses in ﬁts and starts as promising avenues of
research are explored, and then backed away from as researchers change their
focus to other, seemingly more promising avenues of research. Then, as still other
developments raise questions about these new avenues or as technological devel-
opments occur, the older avenues of research become more attractive and are
reexplored with new understanding and new knowledge. That pattern of ebb and
ﬂow seems to be happening with economists’ study of the foundations of utility
theory and measurement, which increasingly is attracting the attention of modern
researchers (Easterlin, 2002; Kahneman, Diener, and Schwartz, 1999; Layard, 2005;
Camerer, Lowenstein, and Prelec, 2005; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Reder,
2006; Bruni and Porta, 2005).
In this article, I discuss some earlier debates about the foundations of utility
and its measurement, focusing on the contributions of Francis Y. Edgeworth
(1845–1926), a famous British economist who was a leader in the development of
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(1867–1947), one of the ﬁrst quantitative U.S. economists, best-known today for his
work on the quantity theory and interest rate theory. Edgeworth argued that utility
was directly measurable and that new developments in “physio-psychology” would
make it possible to develop a “hedonimeter” that would allow economists to
develop a ﬁrm physiological underpinning of utility. Fisher, while agreeing with
Edgeworth that it was important to have a workable measure of utility, disagreed
with Edgeworth about the possibility of doing so with a hedonimeter and, hence, of
having any physiological underpinnings of utility. He argued that instead of search-
ing for physiological underpinnings of utility, economists should instead rely upon
backward induction from observed behavior to measured utility. Neither of these
views about the possibility of utility measurement carried through, and attempts to
measure utility were abandoned in the 1930s, when utility measurement and
happiness considerations were determined to be outside the purview of economics.
There are, of course, many aspects of the debate about the dimensionality and
measurability of utility. In this paper, I focus on the historical debate over whether
economists should be searching for a direct measurement of utility or an indirect
measurement of utility. I do not enter the historical debates about ordinal and
cardinal dimensions of measurement, the additive aspects of utility functions, or
the issues surrounding indifference curve analysis. Discussions of these topics can
be found in history-of-thought books, such as Blaug (1996), and in Stigler’s (1950)
classic discussion of the history of utility theory.
Edgeworth’s Hedonimeter
In the 1870s, economics was moving away from classical theories of value based
on labor or cost, and moving toward neoclassical theories, which were associated
with a mathematization and formalization of economics, a process that gave greater
focus to utilitarian foundations of value. In this context, the measurability of utility
became a central topic.
Edgeworth entered the discussion when in Mathematical Psychics (1881 [1961]),
his most famous book, he responded to some pessimistic views about the measur-
ability of utility that had recently been expressed by William Stanley Jevons (1835–
1882).
1 Edgeworth posited the development of a hedonimeter that would measure
utility, which he felt was necessary for the extension of utility analysis to the real
world. To posit this hedonimeter, he ﬁrst had to develop precisely what was meant
by a unit of pleasure, which he does in Appendix III of Mathematical Psychics.
Edgeworth admits (p. 98) that there is “much difﬁculty here” and that “hedonism
1 It is often very difﬁcult in the history of thought to specify an author’s views unambiguously, both
because those views change and because their views can be interpreted differently in different contexts.
As Stigler (1950) points out, stating precisely what Jevons believed about measuring utility is very
difﬁcult, since his writings present a number of contradictory views.
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described by Professor Jevons”; but Edgeworth ﬁnds that it is nonetheless useful to
“endeavour to gain as clear a view as may be,” and he discusses the quantitative
estimates that a person can make of his own pleasure or the pleasure of others.
Edgeworth (p. 101; italics in the original) describes in practical terms how a
hedonimeter would work. He writes:
To precise [sic] the ideas, let there be granted to the science of pleasure what
is granted to the science of energy; to imagine an ideally perfect instrument,
a psychophysical machine, continually registering the height of pleasure
experienced by an individual, exactly according to the verdict of conscious-
ness, or rather diverging therefrom according to a law of errors. From moment
to moment the hedonimeter varies; the delicate index now ﬂickering with the
ﬂutter of the passions, now steadied by intellectual activity, low sunk whole
hours in the neighbourhood of zero, or momentarily springing up towards
inﬁnity. The continually indicated height is registered by photographic or
other frictionless apparatus upon a uniformly moving vertical plane. Then the
quantity of happiness between two epochs is represented by the area con-
tained between the zero-line, perpendiculars thereto at the points corre-
sponding to the epochs, and the curve traced by the index; or, if the
correction suggested in the last paragraph be admitted, another dimension
will be required for the representation. The integration must be extended
from the present to the inﬁnitely future time to constitute the end of pure
egoism.
Edgeworth (1881 [1961], p. 102) then extends his reasoning to all individuals:
“We have only to add another dimension expressing the number of sentients, and
to integrate through all time and over all sentience, to constitute the end of pure
utilitarianism.” Edgeworth recognized the practical problems of aggregating across
individual utilities, but he argued (p. 102) that the “greater uncertainty of hedon-
imetry in the case of others’ pleasures may be compensated by the greater number
of measurements, a wider average; just as, according to the theory of probabilities,
greater accuracy may be attained by more numerous observations with a less perfect
instrument.” He further argued that this machine would, in principle, offer recon-
ciliation between egoism and altruism, since the pleasure that people take in the
happiness of others would be measurable, or as Edgeworth (p. 104) put it, the
hedonimeter would integrate into utility “the psychical side of a physical change in
what may be dimly discerned as a sort of hedonico-magnetic ﬁeld.”
Edgeworth’s discussion of hedonic measurement was based on developments
in psychology, where “psychophysics” was seen as cutting-edge work at the time.
Psychophysicists were interested in developing a sensory theory that related exter-
nal stimuli to individual feelings. Psychophysics was built on work by Ernst Weber
(1795–1878), a professor of physiology at the University of Leipzig who conducted
experiments that explored the relationships between physical sensory sensations
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weights, and added additional weights in small increments. He had the individuals
indicate when they sensed the increased weight. In doing so, he found that people’s
sense of additional weight was proportional to the relative, not the absolute,
increase in weight, so that when the weight the blindfolded person was holding was
doubled, the threshold for sensing the increased weight also doubled. He found
that that this general relationship held not only for perceptions of weight, but also
for perceptions of visions and sound.
Weber’s work (1834 [1978]) was publicized and extended by G. T. Fechner
(1801–1887) in Elements of Psychophysics (1860 [1966]). Fechner suggested a theo-
retical explanation for Weber’s observations and put the relationships in functional
form, which he called Weber’s Law, but which later psychologists called the
Weber–Fechner Law. In mathematical form that law is
p  k  lnS/S0,
where p is the individual’s perception of a change, S is the added stimulus, S0 is the
beginning stimulus, and k is the relationship parameter.
2 Thus, for example, if one
were initially holding a large weight, one would need a larger weight added for one
to perceive the difference than one would if one were initially holding a smaller
weight.
Fechner (1860 [1966], p. 7) waxed eloquent about psychophysics, arguing that
it can be seen as “an exact theory of the functionally dependent relations of body
and soul.” In attempting to develop a theoretical foundation of the relationship,
Fechner referred back to Rene Descartes, who saw the pineal gland as the place
where body and soul met. (Recent work in science has found a link between the
pineal gland and individuals’ perception of wellbeing, in the sense that the pineal
gland is by far the richest site of the neurotransmitter serotonin in the brain.)
Fechner believed that he had discovered more than simply an empirical relation-
ship; he believed that he had discovered a fundamental insight into our under-
standing of the mind.
Not all psychologists of the day accepted Fechner’s interpretation of the law as
a description of utility or happiness; some suspected a more primitive mental
connection. For example, the pioneering Harvard psychologist William James
(1890, ch. 13) saw Fechner’s work as more a generalization about frictions in neural
machinery. He wrote: “If our feelings resulted from a condition of the nerve-
molecules which it grew ever more difﬁcult for the stimulus to increase, our feelings
would naturally grow at a slower rate than the stimulus itself. An ever larger part of
the latter’s work would go to overcoming the resistances, and an ever smaller part
to the realization of the feeling-bringing state.”
2 In psychology, the Weber–Fechner Law has been superseded by the Stevens’ Power Law (1957), which
speciﬁes the relationship between sensation as S  kI
a where S is the intensity of sensation, I is the
magnitude of physical stimulus, and the exponent a is empirically estimated and differs among senses.
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time, and his interpretation of the theory dovetails with Edgeworth’s description of
the hypothesized hedonimeter. Some economists even believed that Fechner’s
work provided a scientiﬁc psychological foundation for the then-developing law of
diminishing marginal utility, which implied that changes in income at high levels of
income would be less perceptible than changes in income at low levels of income.
The foundation for the law was important politically because within a utilitarian
framework, which was accepted by many economists of the time, the goal of public
policy was to maximize some measure of aggregate utility. Within that framework,
diminishing marginal utility seemed to imply scientiﬁc support for a progressive
income tax.
Fisher’s Alternative Approach to Measuring Utility
The beliefs that there could be a sensory measurement of utility, and that such
a sensory measurement was necessary for economics to be a precise science, were
not universally accepted by economists of the time. In Irving Fisher’s Ph.D. disser-
tation (written in 1891; published in 1892 and 1925), Fisher attempted to provide
a mathematical foundation for economics. In it, he took a quite different approach
to measuring utility than Edgeworth had. Fisher attempted to provide a rigorous,
quantitative, deﬁnition of utility; a proof that utility could be measured; and a
method of measuring utility that did not rely on physiological measurements.
Fisher argued that economics should not rely on direct measurement of utility, but
instead rely on an indirect approach that worked backwards from individual
choices to measures of utility. He was not interested in building measurements of
utility on psychological foundations, but rather in making judgments about utility
based on people’s behavior.
In the preface to his dissertation, Fisher discusses the difference between his
approach and Edgeworth’s. He writes that he ﬁrst saw Edgeworth’s book three days
after Part II of the dissertation was ﬁnished. As Fisher sees it, his approach is similar
to Edgeworth’s in that they both recognize that utility is a function of all commod-
ities, not separable by commodities as had been assumed by Jevons. This insight had
signiﬁcant implications for relating marginal utility to an aggregate measure of
utility, and to consumer surplus. However, Fisher also notes the major difference
between their approaches—Fisher does not base his measurement of utility on
Fechner’s work, while Edgeworth does.
Fisher argued that economics does not need a psychophysical foundation for
utility—individuals reveal their utility through their actions. Fisher (1892 [1925],
p. vi) speciﬁcally ruled out basing utility on physiological measurements: “Edge-
worth, following the Physiological Psychologist Fechner, answers: ‘Just perceivable
increments of pleasure are equatable’ (p. 99) [the page reference is to Edgeworth’s
Mathematical Psychics]. I have always felt that utility must be capable of a deﬁnition
which shall connect it with its positive or objective commodity relations. A physicist
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muscular sensation.” Fisher (p. vi, vii; italics in the original) continues the argu-
ment: “This foisting of Psychology on Economics seems to me inappropriate and
vicious.
3 Fisher (p. 11, italics in the original) then continues the argument, writing,
“To ﬁx the idea of utility the economist should go no farther than is serviceable in
explaining economic facts. It is not his province to build a theory of psychology.”
Fisher argues that economists should content themselves with what he calls a
“simple psychoeconomic postulate: Each individual acts as he desires.”
4
While compared to Edgeworth, Fisher was much more closely tied to what
became the mainstream view of utility, his approach signiﬁcantly differed from
what became standard theory. The view that became prevalent after the 1940s was
that interpersonal utility comparisons were unachievable and unnecessary for
economics; in contrast, Fisher held the position that for utility theory to be useful,
it had to be measurable. Thus, Fisher’s difference with Edgeworth did not concern
the measurability and comparability of utility; it concerned whether that measure-
ment should be direct or indirect.
Another way in which Fisher and other mathematically oriented economists
attempted to separate mathematical economics from these sensual foundations can
be seen in the debate about what to call utility. Most mathematical economists
wanted a separate name given to utility, to separate their analysis from the concep-
tion of utility having a physiological or welfare basis. They argued that the term
“utility” was associated with pleasure and welfare, which implies a sensual founda-
tion, whereas all an economist could actually observe were desires. Fisher (1892/
1925, p. 11, italics in the original) wrote: “The plane of contact between psychology
and economics is desire.” Among the alternate names, Vilfredo Pareto (1909
[1971]) favored the term “ophlelimity”; Fisher (1918) favored “wantab”; and
Arthur C. Pigou (1920 [2002]) used the term “desirability.”
3 While Fisher objected to physiological psychology serving as a foundation for economic theory, he did
not rule out a connection between economics and psychology. In fact, even as Fisher justiﬁed his
statistical approach to measuring utility, he lauded the behavioralist approach in psychology. Fisher
(1892, p. 180) writes, “So economists cannot afford to be too academic and shirk the great practical
problems pressing upon them merely because these happen to touch on unsolved, perhaps insoluble,
philosophical problems. The psychologist has set the example by becoming a ‘behaviorist.’ He can
thereby deal practically with phenomena the essential nature of which he confesses he cannot fathom.”
4 One reason why Fisher took this stand against a physiological approach was to insulate the mathemat-
ical approach, which both he and Edgeworth were advocating, from the challenge that the mathematical
approach was simply a metaphysical psychophysical approach—an attack to which he felt some advo-
cates of the new approach were vulnerable. (By “metaphysical” they meant that it implied discussions of
immeasurable, and hence unscientiﬁc, concepts.) Fisher (1892 [1925], p. vii) notes that others besides
Edgeworth were making a connection between utility and sensory foundations, speciﬁcally stating that
“Gossen and Jevons appeared to regard the ‘calculus of Pleasure and Pain’ as part of the profundity of
their theory.” He continues: “They doubtless saw no escape from its use. The result has been that
‘mathematics’ has been blamed for ‘restoring the metaphysical entities previously discarded.’” The last
quotation to which Fisher refers is referenced as coming from Dr. Ingram, which most likely refers to
John Ingram, the author of a history of political economy book (Ingram, 1888[1907]), which according
to Richard Howey (1985) was the only history of political economy book of the time that referred to
marginal utility.
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accepted by most of the profession. In the early 1900s, a number of economists
distanced themselves from any physiological connection between economics and
psychology. For example, Friedrich von Wieser (1924 [1927]), an important econ-
omist working in the Austrian tradition, wrote in his second edition of Social
Economics that even though the method he uses has been recently designated as the
“psychological” method, it does not have any connection to the physiological
foundations of utility. He stated (p. 3) “that designation is ‘not a fortunate one’”
and that it does not start from “scientiﬁc psychology.” Von Wieser speciﬁcally
separates himself and Hermann Gossen, a German economist who was involved in
the neoclassical revolution, from any association with Weber’s Law. He further
states that his and Gossen’s approach has nothing to do with physiology, writing
(p. 2), “Gossen’s law of satiable wants, the foundation of the modern theory of
value, has nothing to do with Weber’s law. Economic theory would be beneﬁted,
had scientiﬁc psychology advanced further beyond its beginnings; but our disci-
pline does not seek and could not ﬁnd direct aid from this source. The tasks of the
two branches of knowledge are entirely distinct.”
Although Fisher did not base his theory on psychophysical laws, he believed
that he could statistically measure utility and “prove” the law of diminishing
marginal utility. In a later essay, Fisher (1927) further developed his reasoning and
proposed a statistical method for measuring utility.
5 Fisher quotes a question from
Jevons on measurability: “‘But where,’ the reader will perhaps ask, ‘are your
numerical data for estimating pleasures and pains in Political Economy?’ I answer,
that my numerical data are more abundant and precise than those possessed by any
other science, but that we have not yet known how to employ them. . . . But it is
chieﬂy a want of method and completeness in this vast mass of information which
prevents our employing it in the scientiﬁc investigations of the natural laws of
Economics” (Fisher, pp. 158–59). He further argues that “such records . . . ought,
on proper analysis, to yield a real statistical measurement of this most elusive of
magnitudes.” Having made that bold statement, Fisher then backtracks and argues
that even if it might not be possible to measure utility for an individual, it is for the
aggregate. He writes: “We can often gauge a mass effect when we cannot gauge its
constituent parts,” and in justifying his argument, he quotes the famous physicist,
5 This essay was actually written and circulated in mimeograph form earlier, but was published only in
1927. In his discussion of Fisher, Stigler (1950, p. 379) distinguishes Fisher’s (1892) early views on utility,
which Stigler presents as emphasizing the difﬁculties of constructing a utility function, from Fisher’s
later writings (1927) in which Fisher discusses his method for measuring marginal utility. In contrast, I
see much more connection between Fisher’s early and later writings. For example, in the preface to the
reprint of his dissertation, Fisher (1925, p. iv) states: “The suggestion in this booklet that so-called
‘marginal utility’ may be measured is now being followed up.” The reason Fisher did not develop the
statistical measurement work in his dissertation was not that he did not believe that it was important, but
rather that the dissertation focused on theoretical and mathematical issues only, which is why Fisher
(1925, p. v, italics in the original) describes his dissertation as “a study by mathematical methods of the
determination of value and prices.”
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its parts” (p. 159).
Fisher’s views on the measurability of utility may seem strange to modern
economists who have been brought up on the assumption of making no interper-
sonal welfare comparisons. However, they were not strange in the early 1900s when,
in applied policy analysis, economists believed that interpersonal comparisons had
to be made to have a practical measure of welfare to use in policy analysis. The best
of these economists, such as Fisher, fully understood the analytic difﬁculties and the
assumptions one would have to make to move from the theoretical concepts to the
empirically measured concepts. Fisher (and Ragnar Frisch, who carried on with
Fisher’s approach) carefully speciﬁed those theoretical difﬁculties and assumptions
necessary for their method of drawing inferences about utility.
Fisher’s (1927, pp. 179–180) justiﬁcation for the interpersonal comparisons of
wants, which his statistical method required, was pragmatism. He posed the rhe-
torical question whether the necessary assumptions can be used, and answers: “To
all these questions I would answer ‘yes’—approximately at least. But the only, or
only important, reason I can give for this answer is that, in actual practical human
life, we do proceed on just such assumptions.” He continues: “Philosophical doubt
is right and proper, but the problems of life cannot, and do not, wait.”
Fisher (1927) claimed that he had applied his method to certain available
statistics of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. He wrote (p. 193): “The results
conﬁrm the common idea that progressive rather than regressive taxation of
incomes is justiﬁed.” However, Fisher does not present the statistics in the essay,
explaining that the data “need to be ‘smoothed’ and subjected to critical analysis
for varying size of family and other complications before the results can be
considered even roughly accurate.”
While Fisher did not further develop his measurement, Ragnar Frisch, a
Norwegian economist who visited Yale in the late 1920s and worked with Fisher,
did. Speciﬁcally, Frisch (1932 [1978]) expanded on Fisher’s work, and both further
developed an axiomatic foundation to utility measurement that became indiffer-
ence curve analysis and provided some estimates of statistical measurements of
utility at different income levels. Following up Fisher’s ideas, Frisch collected data
on spending patterns for groups of people in different cities where real income
varied over time. He argued that it was reasonable to assume that the average utility
functions of these broad groups were comparable, and that, by measuring how
spending patterns changed over time as real income in these areas ﬂuctuated, he
could determine what he called a “ﬂexibility curve.” He further argued that this
ﬂexibility curve could be integrated to arrive at an ordinal measure of utility at
different levels of income. Fisher (1927) and Frisch (1932 [1978]) offer a detailed
discussion of the approach. Frisch then used those statistical measurements to
argue for the justice of a progressive income tax.
Fisher’s approach did not catch on. With the economics profession’s accep-
tance of Lionel Robbins’s (1932) argument against using interpersonal welfare
comparisons, which were necessary to use the statistical measurement approach,
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If one could not compare utilities among individuals, or at least groups of individ-
uals, then all hope of actually developing a workable measure of utility for applied
policy was hopeless. Thus, with the acceptance of Robbins’s arguments, all that
remained of Fisher’s approach was the axiomatic foundation to utility theory. It is
that axiomatic approach that shows up in intermediate micro texts.
7
Conclusion
Both Edgeworth and Fisher knew that their approaches to utility measurement
opened up a Pandora’s box of problems, most speciﬁcally the issue of interpersonal
utility comparisons. But they opened that box nonetheless because they felt that
theoretical economics had to be relevant to policy, and, to be relevant, theoretical
economics had to face those problems. In the 1930s, the economics profession
decided to close that box and not to follow up either Edgeworth’s direct approach
or Fisher’s indirect approach to utility measurement. That freed up theoretical
work and applied policy work to go their separate paths. Theoretical welfare
economics abandoned utility measurement as unnecessary. The problems of that
abandonment for theory were noted by Jan de V. Graaff (1959, p. 169), who in his
book Theoretical Welfare Economics concluded that without making some interper-
sonal utility comparisons “the possibility of building a useful and interesting theory
of welfare economics—i.e. one which consists of something more than the barren
formalisms typiﬁed by the marginal equivalences of conventional theory—is ex-
ceedingly small.”
Real-world applied work didn’t abandon utility measurement; instead, until
recently, it abandoned utility theory, and adopted simplistic measures of utility that
didn’t take into account the theoretical problems with which Fisher and Edgeworth
were struggling. The problems of doing so were noted by Slesnick (1998, p. 2019)
who wrote that until recently there has been little cross fertilization between theory
and applied policy work, and that the standard applied economist’s approach of
assuming a representative consumer in applied policy work is “unappealing both
because distributional issues are ignored and because much evidence shows that
6 In Colander (2005), I argue that Robbins’s views were misinterpreted, and that in applied work, he
believed that interpersonal comparisons were necessary and acceptable. He just did not want that work
called science.
7 The debates on measuring utility continued after the period I have discussed, as economics moved to
ordinal measures of utility and Pareto optimality as the central welfare criteria. Stigler (1950) traces that
development through Marshall, Pareto, and Slutsky. Ultimately, economics moved away from calculus,
which framed these earlier discussions, and developed a set-theoretic axiomatic foundation for utility,
thereby restructuring the discussion. In that set-theoretic deﬁnition, utility is a formal ranking without
any sensory elements. Chipman (1960, p. 221) summarizes the axiomatic deﬁnition nicely: “Utility, in its
most general form, is a lexicographic ordering, represented by a ﬁnite or inﬁnite dimensional vector
with real components, unique only up to an isotone (order-preserving) homogeneous transformation.”
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agent.”
Given the problems created by the separation of theory and applied work, it is
a positive sign that modern theoretical economists are returning to utility theory
and to utility measurement issues, and are reopening the questions that led
economists to set aside large portions of this topic in the 1930s. But the path
forward will not be easy. Behavioral economics, by showing that context and
framing of decisions matter, is undermining any simply backward induction from
agents’ choices to agents’ welfare, which was the foundation of Fisher’s indirect
utility measurement approach. If an indirect approach must take into account
people’s behavioral characteristics, then the measurement issues based on an
individual’s revealed choices become much more complicated.
Despite the problems which behavioral economics presents for his approach,
I suspect that Fisher would have applauded this new work for the same reason that
he applauded behavioral psychology earlier—it was dealing with real-world obser-
vations. Similarly, I suspect that Edgeworth would have been a strong supporter of
neuroeconomics work with brain scans to relate experience to a person’s pleasure
and pain (Camerer, Lowenstein, and Prelec, 2005). While this work is far from
Edgeworth’s hedonimeter, its careful consideration of the neurological founda-
tions of pleasure provides insight into how people respond to different events,
something that Edgeworth felt was necessary to apply economic theory.
Where this new theoretical and empirical work on measurement issues of
happiness and utility will lead is uncertain, but I strongly believe that economics will
be better for it. The result will be a richer and more nuanced relationship between
economics and policy than currently exists.
y I would like to thank Jim Hines, Timothy Taylor, and Michael Waldman for their very
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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